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Preliminaries to the Study 
of Morality and Law1
Universal Benevolence
However, secondly, an individual may behave socially by feeling uni-
versal benevolence. It is by no means true that an individual is always 
driven by their own interest and always and only strives for what brings 
them a personal gain. Human nature can be driven by disinterested pur-
suits that are aimed towards something that is neither one’s own pleasure 
nor a lessening of one’s own distress. An individual often pursues some-
thing that does not bring them any personal gain and that they must 
pay for with considerable or even great distress: they work for others, 
renounce their own joys, risk their life to promote the welfare of others 
or to spare them from suffering. Admittedly, having achieved their un-
selfish aim, the individual often feels very great joy; but the joy is only 
secondary and it is not because of it that they continue their pursuit that 
has somebody else’s welfare in view. The joy is a shadow, as it were, 
that follows an outgoing pursuit. 
There are various outgoing pursuits. A mother’s love strives to pro-
vide her child a maximum of joy and pleasure, and spare the child as 
much suffering as possible; in other words, she strives to maximise the 
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child’s happiness or, to put it differently, to ensure the child receives 
the greatest share of happiness possible. The same pursuit is shown by 
sexual love; the same, but perhaps not so strong, by friendship and that 
kind of goodwill that is distressed to see others suffer and rejoices in 
somebody else’s joy. This goodwill is colloquially called benevolence. 
It is more or less active, depending on how ready it is to contribute to the 
happiness of the person to whom it faces. 
Benevolence may be directed at a specific individual: it is individual 
then. Moreover, Peter may show benevolence to many people, to every 
person individually, when they find themselves in need of protection or 
help. In an extreme case, the individual’s heart may be so sensitive as to 
make them show benevolence to all who get into trouble or are harmed. 
Then their benevolence will be general, because it will be shown to ev-
ery person individually and separately.
Such general benevolence is clearly distinguishable from conscious-
ly universal benevolence. It is absolutely aware of the fact that it turns 
towards every individual, values the existence of all people equally, de-
sires the greatest share of happiness for each of them and, finally that 
it is ready to support and make this desire come true through its own 
action and effort. What is more, when the benevolence gains some life 
experience, it will know that the happiness of some entails positively 
or negatively the happiness of others: the happiness of a mother fol-
lows largely from the successes of her child, while the happiness of one 
contestant is limited by the success of another. Hence, in the mind of 
universally benevolent Peter, all people become one mass of whom he 
thinks and must think jointly when he pursues the maximum happiness 
of all people: due to this, he may not go too far in their desire of happi-
ness for individuals considered severally, and thanks to this, universal 
benevolence has an inherent restraining factor that emotions and pur-
suits usually lack. Moreover, benevolence may turn consciously and 
intentionally not only towards every individual, but also towards every 
living creature capable of rejoicing and suffering. 
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In a primitive closed community, benevolence extends to every fel-
low tribesman; in a nation, where bonds can be clearly seen, it covers ev-
ery compatriot; at the highest level of spiritual development, it turns to-
wards every individual and is universal in the strict sense of the word and 
thus it transcends the boundaries of any and all closed communities. Its 
way has been paved by free thought, which indicated that one individual 
resembles another and that everyone rejoices and suffers in the same way. 
This simple idea has effectively and gradually brought down the wall of 
megalomania within which various nations enclosed their communities. 
It must be added that benevolence is truly universal only when it is fully 
conscious that its object is every individual, wherever on earth they live. 
Universal benevolence is the most certain and reliable foundation of 
socialisation; whoever feels it will most likely show consideration for 
others, sympathise with and offer help to them. Therefore, we put the 
greatest confidence in the people of whom we know that they feel uni-
versal benevolence that is vigilant and strong. It is such people that we 
call good, which means that they love their neighbours; actually, univer-
sal benevolence and love of one’s neighbour are one and the same thing. 
Admittedly, many writers think that someone who judiciously 
takes care of their business reckons equally well with others’ business, 
as a good person does. In other words, they say that judicious personal 
calculation produces the same guidance as universal benevolence; what 
is more, that the judicious love of one’s own self brings the same share 
of happiness as love of one’s neighbour. This last-mentioned thesis 
though, is a risky generalisation that cannot possibly be sufficiently con-
firmed; nor can one claim that love for one’s ‘self’ is always judicious. 
Therefore, it is reasonable that good people enjoy greater confidence 
than judicious egoists do; and that almost everybody at least wants to 
be regarded as good by others, if only to dull their vigilance. Everybody 
knows that sharp claws are a great gift of nature if they can be hidden in 
soft paws. That is why, since time immemorial hypocrisy has been pay-
ing due tribute to universal benevolence. 
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This benevolence, in turn, is a natural umpire, a superordinate arbi-
trator, in communal life. Other pursuits and emotions often vary greatly 
from person to person. Love of one’s own “self” in one person often 
entails that they deliberately wish harm to another person. One person’s 
ambition strives towards the exact opposite objective than that of an-
other person. By the same token, one person’s greed easily runs afoul of 
the greed of another. 
A quite different story is that of universal benevolence in various peo-
ple: it pursues the same objective in all, namely, to maximise everybody’s 
share of happiness. Thereby universal benevolence develops a natural bond 
between people, that is, a unity of purpose. This emotion does not divide; 
it rather unites people and easily draws an emotional response from others 
that increases and amplifies benevolence. That is why disapproval by uni-
versal benevolence is so grave a judgement in communal life, for it is always 
highly probable that it will spread in the community. Thus, although univer-
sal benevolence is an emotion, generally speaking, of moderate strength, the 
social response amplifies it greatly and awakens it anew in various situa-
tions, making it vigilant and providing it with a great penetrating force: only 
rarely does it explode in violent outrage, it rather makes itself felt through 
a reproach that nags stubbornly like a minor but unbearable pain. 
Universal benevolence, it is true, may sometimes apparently di-
vide people in an extreme case, where Peter and John do not agree on 
the means to the same end. Such a conflict, however, is not a deep rift, 
because there are no pursuits here that cannot be reconciled. It is easy to 
agree on means when people are bound by the same emotion, especially 
universal benevolence. It is enough to have the same knowledge on the 
laws of nature. 
Moral Judgement
Universal benevolence is interested only in people or, at best, those 
living creatures whose fate elicits a strong emotional response from 
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humans. It is pleased with all that reduces human suffering or brings 
people joy. This is judged by it as positively valuable. It is displeased 
by all that brings or increases suffering or reduces or destroys joy. This 
is judged by it as negatively valuable. In the eyes of universal benevo-
lence, various things may be positively or negatively valuable; positively 
valuable things are, for instance, a medication which radically contains 
an epidemic, a highway that makes travel easy for everybody, a forest 
that offers beautiful views and supplies timber for furniture and heating 
homes; negatively valuable things are, on the other hand, a drought that 
destroys crops or a flood that washes houses away. 
However, universal benevolence focuses in particular on the attitude 
of the individual towards others. For it is in a community that the life of 
every individual is lived; their joys and suffering largely depend on the 
conduct of others. For this reason, universal benevolence scrutinises 
what emotions an individual feels towards their neighbours, what se-
cret pursuits are hidden in such emotions and what actions and pursuits 
result from such emotions that have a positive or negative impact on 
the share of happiness of other people. 
The judgement passed by universal benevolence, whose object is 
an emotion felt by one person for another, a pursuit concerning another 
or an action that influences the fate of another or other persons—this 
judgement is known as a moral judgement. At the same time, the only 
generator of moral judgements is universal benevolence: this makes 
such judgements stand out sharply and distinctly from others. Emo-
tions, pursuits and actions concerning other people may be also trig-
gered by other emotions than universal benevolence; these other emo-
tions may also generate judgements, not moral ones though – judge-
ments of some other kind. Let’s say Peter likes the courage with which 
John defends Adam against danger. Peter, therefore, positively judges 
John’s conduct: the judgement in this case is aesthetical and not moral. 
Here again Eve is angry with John, because he has punished her son; 
she bears a grudge against him: the generator of the judgement is ma-
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ternal love; this judgement is not a moral one either. The same emotion 
or action, however, may be the object of two or more emotional reac-
tions at the same time and in the same individual. Peter’s universal be-
nevolence may morally approve of the courageous way that John helped 
Adam and, at the same time, Peter may like that courage.
The closest object of moral judgement for every individual is their 
own experiences and actions. An individual may judge them right af-
ter they happen, when they are still fresh in their mind or later when they 
have already moved into the past from which memory brings them back. 
In addition, every person, as a rule, can judge more deeply and justly 
their own experiences, because they can, if they so wish, probe them 
more deeply and notice what is completely inaccessible to others. Uni-
versal benevolence as a generator of moral judgements, which concern 
one’s own experiences and actions, is called conscience. As mentioned 
earlier, universal benevolence provokes rather moderate emotional reac-
tions, or even weak ones, but often they are persistently recurrent: this 
is the source of their strength and role in consciousness. 
Universal benevolence places a positive value on emotions and ac-
tions that are favourable or friendly to other people. In turn, it assigns 
a negative value to the emotions and actions that are unfavourable or 
unfriendly. A sound conscience, however, one not selfishly directed at 
one’s own self and person, does not pay equal attention to its emotions 
and actions, either morally positive or negative. Universal benevolence 
above all intends to prevent other people from being harmed; hence, it 
is quick to nip in the bud even those experiences and predispositions to 
experiences that may beget injurious actions. Moreover, it scrutinises 
actions that have already caused harm, but gives less attention to the 
emotions and actions that are friendly to people. Hence, conscience very 
rarely praises but frequently reprimands, because under its inquisitive 
eyes there is a lot of wickedness in a human soul when viewed from the 
inside. 
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Social Moral Judgement
When Peter’s universal benevolence judges his own experiences and 
actions, it is his own internal concern, touching his person, and may 
not be known to anybody else: thus, it is an individual judgement. Pe-
ter’s benevolence though, may also be interested in the experiences and 
actions of other people, because they may be highly relevant for those 
whom they concern. Peter may be really worried by John’s hatred for 
Adam as it may beget an action harming Adam. Stemming from uni-
versal benevolence, Peter’s judgement of John’s experience or actions 
directed at Adam, is a social moral judgement. 
In the judgement, three persons are involved: Peter who judges, 
John whose experience or action is being judged and, finally, Adam 
whom John’s experience or actions concern. This may be presented in 
a schematic manner as follows: A in their universal benevolence judges 
an experience or action of person B directed at person C. Moreover, 
it is possible that the experience or action concerns not just one per-
son C, but many people or an entire group: thus B hates Egyptians or the 
monarchy of Ramses XII. 
In this case, too, universal benevolence is a generator; but it keeps 
an uneven eye on persons B and C; specifically, it preferentially turns to-
wards C and person B is subordinated to the interests of C, because the 
experience or action of B is judged in terms of the welfare of C. Espe-
cially when A negatively judges the experience or action of B, it may ap-
pear that A, contrary to universal benevolence, has an unfavourable at-
titude towards B, while A’s attitude towards C is biased and preferential. 
Actually, however, A remains benevolent in respect of B as well; they 
only demand of him what universal benevolence lets him demand or 
rather tells him to demand. What is more, if John and Adam traded plac-
es in the triad, Peter would subordinate Adam to John, or C to B in the 
same manner. In fact, people do this all the time in real life, alternating 
between judging the experiences and actions of one or the other. 
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When Peter judges his own experience or action, he splits, so to 
speak, into two persons, A and B. Since, however, the judgement con-
cerns his own experience, it quite naturally enjoys a considerable caus-
ative power in Peter’s soul and produces an impulse that amplifies the 
force of the experience further or weakens and restrains it, depending on 
whether it is positive or negative. The moral judgement, thus, of one’s 
own experience or action always has a smaller or greater impact on Pe-
ters experiences and attitude. 
However, Peter’s judgement concerning John’s experience does not 
have to have any causative power in the soul of the latter. In an extreme 
case, John may not care at all what Peter thinks about his experience or 
emotion, and he may not care about Peter as a person either. It may not 
matter at all, either, that Peter’s judgement was engendered by universal 
benevolence, since John may not know this emotion and does not heed 
its suggestions. Then, Peter’s judgement does not elicit any emotional 
response in John’s soul. 
John himself though, may feel universal benevolence to some de-
gree. As the voice of conscience, it could have already passed judgement 
on a given emotion or action before John learned of Peter’s judgement. 
If it is consistent with his, it will elicit a positive emotional response 
and amplify it considerably. If there are many—or very many—such 
Peters who judge a given experience in the same way as John does, the 
consistency takes away relativisation from the moral judgement in his 
eyes: it appears to John that his own judgement and the judgements of 
Peters who agree with him do not depend on their experiences, but they 
rather appear and suggest themselves to them in the manner in which 
descriptive truths do, irrespective of any emotions and pursuits. This 
is a common and almost unavoidable illusion whereby in a group we 
stop noticing or simply do not notice the factors that make up the suf-
ficient cause of that factor which is invariably given in the group. It is 
only natural that John forgets that it is universal benevolence that tells 
him and all his Peters to pass the same judgement, and that it appears to 
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him that he finds and notices the values of experiences and actions in the 
same way as he does the shapes and colours of objects. Nonetheless, 
there are no absolute values; there are only values here invariably stem-
ming from some emotion that is common among given people. 
Hence, when a judgement is expressed in words, it is always nec-
essary to indicate what emotion or pursuit it stems from. To indicate, 
thus, that a given judgement is moral, it must be mentioned that it 
stems from universal benevolence. This emotion, roughly speaking, 
always and in every person dictates the same judgement; in principle, 
therefore, it is not necessary to indicate each time in whose soul uni-
versal benevolence forms a given judgement. It often happens, though, 
that a global judgement of some object or event depends largely on 
Peter’s knowledge of the laws of nature and the entire set of factors 
that come into play in a given case. It is desirable then to indicate the 
person who forms the judgement, because in this way one implicitly 
indicates what knowledge of the object the person has when making 
the judgement in question. 
A consistent judgement by many Peters may have a persuasive pow-
er over John even when he does not spontaneously formulate a moral 
judgement of his experience or action. It is quite probable that John ei-
ther has, albeit deeply hidden, a predisposition to be moved by universal 
benevolence or at least, he may imagine the attitude taken by this emo-
tion by analogy to his other emotions. He himself feels at least equal be-
nevolence towards his family members or friends. He may thus imagine 
how he would judge somebody else’s experience or action if he extend-
ed his benevolence to all people. In the first case, a universal judgement 
will uncover their own universal benevolence and stir their conscience; 
in the second case, the judgement will at least tell him how to behave so 
as not to incur universal disapproval. Further, if he continues to heed this 
guidance and behave as if he were guided by universal benevolence, it is 
likely that he will learn to look with the eyes of universal benevolence, 
either because this emotion, hitherto unknown to him, will rise in him, 
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or because he will develop a habit of action consistent with the direc-
tions of this emotion. 
An important aspect for communal life is the fact that John may 
adopt ready-made judgements from his Peter or Peters. Imagine that be-
cause of a lack of experience or any relevant knowledge, John is not 
suggested any judgement by universal benevolence in a given case. John 
though, learns that Peter, whose universal benevolence is tested, judges 
a thing in a specific manner. If John generally believes that Peter’s moral 
judgements are right, his judgement will easily elicit a response from 
John’s soul and will become his judgement, one of credit, so to speak, 
based on the belief in the rightness of Peter’s judgements. It often hap-
pens that Peter praises the moral value of Adam’s deed, who has brought 
about many momentous changes in communal life. John is not able to 
judge these changes by himself, but eagerly adopts Peter’s judgement, 
deeply moved by admiration or outrage or contempt. Furthermore, John 
may continue to uphold this induced judgement, although Peter may 
later modify his. 
The Peter who suggests a judgement may be not just a person, but 
also a being of a higher order than a person—a being in whose exis-
tence and goodness John believes. In the lively imagination of the an-
cient Greeks, gods told them, often in detail, what was right and wrong. 
Whereas Christianity makes God the principal source of fundamental 
moral precepts and makes divine judgements a model and touchstone. 
This religious belief lends much support to the suggestive power of 
moral judgements: they may not give rise to any doubt, because they 
come from an absolutely perfect Supreme Being who is an embodiment 
of universal benevolence. 
The Object of a Moral Judgement
As already said, universal benevolence scrutinises emotions, pursuits 
and actions that are directed at other people. These experiences and ac-
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tions, however, are treated by universal benevolence in two ways, de-
pending on how they are treated by the person who undergoes or per-
forms them. 
Emotions and pursuits arise in consciousness spontaneously, without 
permission. In the eyes of conscience, they are valuable either positively 
or negatively. Those that are favourable or friendly to people are gener-
ally judged positively, while unfavourable or unfriendly—negatively. 
It is good when an individual feels sympathy, benevolence, gratitude 
and respect for other people; it is bad when they feel envy, anger and 
hatred. Even emotions and pursuits favourable to people though, may 
come into conflict. To name two examples, love for a wife may some-
times stand in the way of the love of a child. Love for a villain may mor-
ally infect the whole nation. In the eyes of universal benevolence only 
universal benevolence is the emotion that is always valued positively, 
because it always has in view the welfare of all people, not only some 
selected ones as other emotions favourable to people do. The latter may 
want too great a share of happiness for their chosen ones. 
The spontaneous appearance of an emotion or pursuit in John’s soul 
does not depend on John’s will but on the entire structure of body and 
soul on which he had little influence, or none at all. Nevertheless, al-
ready here Peter judges these experiences and, possibly, from judging 
them he goes to the judgement of the whole person of John if these 
experiences can be seen to have been borne out of a deep and lasting 
predisposition. Peter judges then that John is good by nature if predis-
positions favourable to people predominate in him, especially universal 
benevolence; whereas Peter judges him to be bad by nature if predispo-
sitions unfavourable to people predominate in him. 
Even though an individual receives a considerable legacy of ready-
made emotional predispositions, they have, after all, some power over 
their emotions and pursuits. As we shall soon see, they can by acts of 
will allow or not allow for the experiences that have already arisen, or 
prevent them from arising. Anger at Adam may arise spontaneously in 
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John’s soul, but John may allow it to burst out, or he may oppose and 
contain it so that it will subside and disappear without doing any harm 
to Adam. In the latter case, Peter, while judging Adam, will consider 
as less important the appearance of anger as such since universal be-
nevolence will effectively control it. Furthermore, John may, knowing 
himself, fend off the thoughts that arouse anger at Adam in time to pre-
vent one of the most unfriendly emotions from arising. 
This power over one’s experiences is enjoyed, to some degree and 
within certain limits, by every normal individual: they interrupt the course 
of thoughts that leads to an undesirable emotion or pursuit, or restrain or 
weaken the undesirable experience by directing their thoughts at some-
thing else or changing their situation so that it disappears by itself or is 
replaced by another experience that will cover and eclipse it. If John does 
not make these efforts to oppose his experience and allows it—being neg-
atively valued by Peter—it will grow even more negative, as the one that 
John has allowed and consciously made as one of his experiences. Uni-
versal benevolence scrutinises these experiences that our will has allowed 
by giving them a privileged position in our consciousness, the reason be-
ing the fact that these experiences may spawn actions, the effects of which 
will encroach on the ambit of other people’s existence. 
Actions, in turn, are an especially important object of a moral judge-
ment, because in the eyes of universal benevolence what counts most is 
stopping one individual from harming others by their action and making 
them contribute the most to their happiness. A hidden and contained 
emotion does not have a chance yet to harm anybody or make them 
happy. It may harm or make happy by the very fact of its divulgence; the 
more so when it is realised in an unfriendly or friendly action. 
We have split the person of Peter in two by carving John out of him 
so as to make clear that Peter may morally judge not only his experienc-
es and actions, but also somebody else’s. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that a moral judgement is above all the inner voice of conscience 
that looks into experiences directly, not having to pierce the armour of 
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another person’s mortal coil, and that it judges not actions alone, which 
can be viewed from without, but the very motives of these actions with-
in that grow out of unseen experiences. 
The insight into one’s inner life may sometimes be misleading, how-
ever, because every individual tries to show themselves in the best pos-
sible light, even to themselves. Unwittingly, they find ways to hold back 
from their own self, in the inner split that is created in the soul when 
conscience sits in judgement, amidst the stirrings of emotions and mo-
tives of action that would cast a negative light on their person or their 
action. Considerable moral discipline is needed, as well as inner hon-
esty and correct insight into one’s emotional experiences, to summon 
the available courage to bring to light the inner experiences that lower 
one’s self-esteem. Individuals shield themselves from this with hypoc-
risy, which even creates an inner show of semblance and illusion to hide 
the foul stench of their moral entrails. 
Peter’s universal benevolence is not able to look into somebody else’s 
experiences with certainty and perspicacity. Every John screens his spiri-
tual sanctum from the piercing eyes of others, and even when he himself 
has a clear and undistorted view of his inner life, he tries to draw a cob-
web of falsely favourable appearances over it. Peter, therefore, as a judg-
ing spectator, can only carefully watch observable behaviour and draw 
cautious conclusions. He can never determine the measure of their prob-
ability with accuracy. The average Peter tends to be insufficiently cau-
tious in his presumptions regarding other people. When he is cautious 
enough, he must necessarily place his moral judgements of others on 
two levels. On one level, there are judgements that are moral in the 
strict sense, where Peter believes himself to be looking into somebody 
else’s inner life and almost sees the stirrings of John’s emotions and the 
motives of his actions. On the other, there are judgements of actions 
themselves and their socially relevant effects. 
These judgements will not be moral in a strict sense; they will pass 
judgment only if an action by John has conformed to the guidance that 
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would be given by universal benevolence in a given case. This does not 
rule out that the action was born out of cold selfish calculation, which 
would deprive it of any moral value. In everyday life, we usually do 
not notice the difference between these two kinds of judgement and 
do not appreciate its weight. An individual who always behaves like 
a good individual seems to be good to us, although in reality they might 
be only calculating, cautious and cunning. Again, people are ashamed to 
show their goodness and even conceal the soft and sensitive stirrings of 
their hearts, thus they make their good deeds look like the business-like 
performance of an external duty. In addition, sometimes it takes special 
circumstances, those breaking the daily routine, for a cold calculation or 
a downright undesirable moral emotion to come out from behind an ac-
tion overtly consistent with a moral norm. Although it is usually not 
conceived out of universal benevolence, the stinging wit of a satirist is 
aimed at prudes and hypocrites. 
However, in terms of social needs, the second, less demanding 
kind of judgement is sufficient for communal life. It is by no means 
a bad thing when people follow moral norms in their conduct, even if 
when they do so they are not guided by moral motives. 
The Principal Moral Norm
Universal benevolence, as was mentioned earlier, strives to ensure an 
equal share of happiness to all people. Thus, it believes that it would be 
good only when the general conditions in which people live were such that 
all would have an equal chance to get a maximum of pleasure with a min-
imum of suffering. Living conditions depend largely on the environment 
and human action cannot influence them. However, they depend not in 
small part on how people treat one another and what they do for one an-
other. Importantly, the larger the number of powerful tools people have 
at their disposal, the greater the impact their action has on their happi-
ness. Thus it is only natural that universal benevolence would like every 
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individual to meet all the conditions necessary for making the greatest 
contribution to the enlargement of the share of happiness of all people. 
Hence, it is natural that universally benevolent Peter values universal 
benevolence most in people, as it is the only emotion that is focused on 
all people and wants happiness for them. 
Universal benevolence concludes, therefore, that the human world 
would be good only if all people were universally benevolent. Hence, 
it believes that every individual should be universally benevolent and 
that this benevolence should effectively guide them in every action. 
Hence, the only principal norm that universal benevolence sets is the 
precept that every individual should be universally benevolent and 
should be guided by this benevolence in every act of their will, as either 
a positive impulse to act or an impulse restraining other actions. 
This norm tacitly assumes that every individual has at least the 
germ of this emotion, which they may develop fully and make an im-
portant component of their constellation of emotions. This assumption 
is not fully justified, as there certainly are people who are unlikely to 
ever allow universal benevolence to develop in their soul. These are 
extreme cases, however; people who are completely lacking in this emo-
tion whatsoever are considered abnormal and morally underdeveloped. 
They are unable to give moral judgements or even imagine them by an 
emotional response, since they lack this predisposition that by response 
could be actualised in an experience.
However, in spiritually normal people, benevolence a universal feel-
ing, sometimes only embryonic or weak, sometimes strong, pervading 
the entire constellation of emotions. The principal moral norm makes 
it an individual’s obligation to give benevolence a decisive say in their 
decisions. 
By a deliberate effort of will, this emotion may be given a dominant 
position. All that is needed is to form a habit of imagining the joys and 
suffering of other people. The habit usually gives rise to, and increases 
the capacity for, an emotional response to somebody else’s joys and 
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suffering. Will, therefore, may affect this emotion to an extent. In that 
case, it may be an individual’s obligation to develop and strengthen this 
emotion in themselves. 
Since, however, every individual ought to be universally benevolent, 
universal benevolence should ipso facto extend its control to their entire 
behaviour. The principal moral norm then takes on another form that 
clearly and in detail sets out what a universally benevolent individual 
should do and what they should refrain from doing. It says now: “every 
individual should as best as they can”: first, “refrain from any action that 
contributes to somebody’s suffering, second, actively reduce the sum of 
suffering of other people” third “refrain from any action that kills other 
people’s joys” and fourth, “actively increase the sum of contentment of 
all people”. 
The principal moral norm has split into four component norms that 
are independent from one another. The first two concern the person’s at-
titude in the face of human suffering, while the second two—somebody 
else’s joy. The first and third prescribe omission while the second and 
fourth—an active attitude. 
For human happiness, all four prescriptions are important, because 
to achieve it a person needs a maximum of joy and a minimum of suf-
fering. Indeed, universal benevolence, in its desire for happiness for all 
people, in principle, puts the four obligations on an equal footing. How-
ever, to direct human conduct really effectively, universal benevolence 
must realistically judge what can be effectively demanded of people. 
It cannot demand too much and must reckon with what response some-
body else’s joy and suffering usually draws from a given individual.
Actually, even the most universally benevolent Peter is unequally 
vigilant and sensitive to the pleasant and unpleasant experiences of 
other people. His eye and attention are caught first of all by the suf-
fering of other people, and he strives above all to prevent the suffering 
of others and remove that which has already arisen. He will be mor-
ally shocked and outraged when he sees John deliberately contribute 
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to Adam’s suffering. He will also think badly of him when he sees that 
John is indifferent to Adam’s suffering and that he does not offer him 
any help. He will not be so shocked and outraged, however, when John 
stays indifferent to the joy that Adam experienced: he can be left alone 
when he is joyful. However, in this case too, Peter will be worried by 
John’s moral attitude if he sees that he is in the habit of not respond-
ing emotionally to the joyful experiences of other people. He will think 
then that John’s sources of universal benevolence are limited after all, 
and that he cannot be counted on to take some action to give others joy. 
John’s benevolence will appear cold and incomplete to him, although he 
will not deny him any moral value for this reason, provided that John is 
sufficiently vigilant and sensitive to other people’s suffering. 
Reckoning realistically with the diverse nature of various people, 
Peter will cautiously create a gradation of moral requirements. He will 
judge that John is not bad if he does not deliberately do any harm to any-
body, in particular, if does not even have an impulse to harm somebody: 
you do not have to be on your guard against a John like this. In this case, 
he respects the first of the mentioned norms that establishes a minimum 
of moral requirements. The individual who breaches this norm and de-
liberately adds to the suffering of others acts already in a morally wrong 
way. 
Higher moral requirements are set in the second norm that prescribes 
an active contribution to the alleviation of other people’s suffering. John 
does not show universal benevolence, at least not actively, if he does 
not offer help when he sees Adam’s suffering. Even if this suffering has 
elicited some response from John’s soul, it attested to only a flicker of 
universal benevolence in his soul, obviously not strong or lively enough 
to make him act; it is like a seed incapable of germinating. Hence, an 
individual is not actively good if they do not live by this second norm; 
externally, they do not differ much from one who is simply not bad. In 
contrast, a person is visibly good if they are effectively stimulated by 
benevolence to give help in suffering. 
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The next place in the gradation of moral requirements is occupied 
by the third norm. It can be said that it, too, extends and supplements the 
moral minimum whose foundation is the first norm. It is clearly wrong 
for John to remove Adam’s source of joy or deprive him of it, even 
though he has not caused Adam to have a painful experience, due to 
his regretting that an awaited joy has not come. For instance, John is 
wrong to block Adam’s beautiful view with a high wall, or to withhold 
news from him that would make him very glad. For taking somebody’s 
joy away means limiting and reducing their share of happiness. With 
this kind of behaviour, the bad intention does not differ much from that 
characterising an action that causes deliberate suffering. 
However, universal benevolence is fully embodied only in the 
fourth norm that prescribes the active multiplication of other people’s 
joy, which involves effort. They who do this prove beyond doubt they 
care a lot about the happiness of other people, elevating to the highest 
level of universal benevolence. Only by doing good to others with the 
aim of increasing thereby the sum of happiness of all people does an 
individual become really good. 
Comments on the Principal Norm
At a first glance, these four norms that extend the concise principal norm 
seem to place too great a burden on an individual. It is still relatively easy 
to take care not to add to other people’s suffering by direct action – that is, 
not to inflict injuries or cause immediately visible damage. However, it is 
very difficult to anticipate accurately and for a more distant future if indi-
rect effects and distant actions may unexpectedly become detrimental to 
one individual or even many. Even if a person knows very many laws of 
nature, the most perspicacious mind is not able to make accurate forecasts 
for the distant future, especially ones concerning the communal life of 
great groups of people. Similarly, it is very hard to predict if somebody 
will not be deprived of a dose of happiness by some incautious, albeit 
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good, action. If John latches a door through everyday habit, he will spoil 
Adam’s bicycle ride as he will be unable to fetch his bicycle from the 
flat. So to avoid harming somebody and detracting from their pleasure, an 
individual must be constantly vigilant and make use of their entire knowl-
edge of the world to avoid harming others. 
A still greater effort is necessary—greater because active—to give 
help to every person who cannot cope with the burdens of life without it. 
There are too many people in need of such help in the world. To ask an 
individual to give help to all is to ask too much. The question thus arises 
of how far the obligation to provide help extends. In addition, marking 
the limits of the obligation, an individual may easily, as it seems, nar-
row their universal benevolence to some restricted community, against 
the prescription of the principal norm. 
Finally, the fourth norm imposes such a great burden that is seems 
to be unrealistic. How can individuals, who are always so restricted in 
what they can do, actively multiply the happiness of all humanity? They 
do not have enough knowledge or power for that, so that cannot truly 
be their obligation. Therefore, the prescriptions of these norms must be 
made more specific so that they do not become hollow desires. 
First and foremost, it must be realised that moral norms concerning 
actions extend only as far as the power to act of a given individual ex-
tends. Moreover, this power is very limited. First, the knowledge of an 
individual and their power of prediction, necessary for any rational 
activity, are very limited, especially when an activity affecting large 
communities is involved. The knowledge of the broadest and most 
perspicacious mind is so limited that it is incapable of predicting the 
diverse plurality of effects that every action generates. An unguarded 
remark may sometimes weigh heavily on the life of an individual or 
their entire circle. An unwary signature of a statesman may bring mis-
ery to a whole nation. However, to reach with our mind into the future 
so as to be able to see clearly the entire growing sequence of effects is 
not possible. 
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Second, the power of action, the bodily and mental energy neces-
sary to make bodily movements and mental efforts, indispensible for 
any action, is very limited in human beings. Even the best individual 
cannot watch over a bedridden person day and night; even the most 
self-sacrificing person will not feed a million of the hungry alone, be-
cause they will tire out and run out of the food that they would be able to 
distribute. It is these physical aspects, which are the necessary material 
and means of action, that often greatly limit the possibility of action. 
These limits shall be called the human range of power. 
The range of power varies from individual to individual; it depends 
on their start in life, including the conditions for their bodily and spiritu-
al development, and the range of things that may be its material. Some-
times the power is so limited that even with the greatest inner goodness 
an individual is practically unable to affect, especially positively, the 
fate of others. Given the structure of the community in which they live, 
they can barely survive on hard work, which consumes all their energy. 
This individual can only refrain from harming others. At the other ex-
treme, an individual may, by means of a decision, release ever greater 
forces of nature or human energy, which are invisibly accumulated in 
organised groups. Here, again, they are short of the knowledge neces-
sary to be able to produce only intended effects by their action and to 
make predictions concerning them, looking as far into the future as their 
range of power extends. Examples include an inventor who builds ma-
chines of great power or a statesman who, with a single stroke of his pen, 
sets in motion millions of people who begin fighting for their freedom. 
What specific obligations are imposed on an individual by the prin-
cipal moral norm depends on their range of power. Impossibilium nulla 
oligatio; there is no obligation to do impossible things. Hence, the weak 
and the powerless should respect only the first and third norm uncon-
ditionally: not to add deliberately to other people’s suffering and not 
to deprive them intentionally of their joys. Besides, however narrow the 
range of their choice is, they should take care that their actions enlarge 
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the global sum of human good as much as possible. The most power-
ful and mighty, however, who can still affect and do affect the fate of 
numerous people are burdened with great obligations, as they should be 
concerned with the level of human misery on a world scale. 
Even the most powerful, however, cannot be obliged to extend their 
thoughts and actions to every human being individually. They can care 
for the happiness of human masses only in a general way, using the or-
ganisational structure of human communities as a tool. The communities, 
being united in one way or another, can be acted on as entities, thus indi-
rectly and secondarily lowering or raising the share of happiness of in-
dividuals. Imagine a minister of finance ordering the salaries of officials 
to be raised: he/she does not know personally even the smallest portion 
of those whose remunerations will rise. Imagine, a great lawmaker re-
forming the government system of a country to improve governance: 
he/she does not know at all that great mass of citizens who one way or 
another will benefit from the reform. 
The reformer still does not satisfy the obligation imposed on them by 
the fourth of the four norms, because their benevolent intention encom-
passes, admittedly, all the citizens of their country but does not encompass 
all people. This reformer, too, however may be driven by a universally 
benevolent thought: I do my best for the universal welfare of all people, 
namely, I improve the fate of those whom I can affect by my action. I would 
do the same for others if I had the power. This thought and intention can 
drive not only a powerful statesman, but also the smallest element of the 
human multitude: this thought and intention, in some humble and timid, in 
others proud or even haughty, give the sense of participation in the great 
collective work of all people of good will. To participate in this enter-
prise, no consent from anybody is necessary. It is in this intention as well, 
even if it concerns a very minor action, that the fourth norm prescribed 
by universal benevolence is already satisfied. It also hides a superordi-
nate thought about not making a given action detract from the general 
sum of happiness; hence, the first and third norms are satisfied as well. 
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However, it must be said and emphasised at this juncture that the 
principal moral norm does not demand at all that any human action 
be driven by a thought about universal happiness or that every action fol-
low from universal benevolence. There are many actions that belong 
solely to the personal domain of a given individual and whose effects 
do not go outside this domain in any observable manner. It is marked 
and approved by universal benevolence itself. Hence, it is John’s abso-
lutely personal matter if he spends the time off he deserves, in the eyes 
of universal benevolence, taking a walk or playing chess. What is more, 
he does not have to walk or play chess having in mind the global sum 
of happiness of all humanity or perform these actions at the behest of 
universal benevolence. This emotion by no means dictates all actions, 
but only exercises general supervision over all impulses and actions in 
accordance with its fourfold norm. 
If according to John’s understanding and knowledge, tea and cof-
fee are equally harmless to him, universal benevolence does not provide 
any guidance in this case. If, however, John knows that coffee is very 
harmful to him and may shorten his life, which is precious to his small 
children, universal benevolence exercises its supervisory veto. Under its 
eyes, John should care about the welfare of his children. It interferes 
in every human matter only as much as the matter, through its causal 
ties, comes into conflict with the interests of other people. Luckily for 
human freedom, there are many things in the world that are mutually 
independent of each other. The ripples made by a stone thrown at one 
shore of a lake will not reach the opposite shore. The fact of John sneez-
ing in his room in Poznań will not have any consequences in Warszawa. 
The Severity of the Principal Norm
Upon closer scrutiny, it thus appears that the principal moral norm does 
not impose unrealistic requirements. Nonetheless, its demands are quite 
stringent, as it requires that all impulses and drives, even the strongest 
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and most spontaneous, be subjected to its supervision. Furthermore, 
it demands that an individual should always actively care for somebody 
else’s interest and suffering and take every possible effort to maximise 
the overall sum of happiness. In the light of these requirements, there is 
not a single individual that would be morally perfect, i.e. an individu-
al that would scrupulously and without any exception discharge all the 
duties imposed on them by the fourfold principal norm. Every person 
actually driven by universal benevolence feels their moral imperfection. 
The more vigorous their universal benevolence, the stronger this imper-
fection is felt, and the more insistently it demands respect for its pre-
scriptions. For they see clearly that they are incapable of the vigilance 
and dedication that universal benevolence demands of them and that, 
what is worse, they resort to various tricks to cheat themselves so as to 
be able to forget conveniently about their moral obligations. Sometimes, 
facing a moral dilemma, they have to tell themselves that they do not 
know where the line between their right and their obligation is. 
Obligations related to earning a living meet with the approval of 
universal benevolence, which prescribes that everybody should work 
in order not to be a burden on others. Earning a living consumes a huge 
portion of an individual’s energy and makes rest necessary, to which 
an individual is morally entitled. Imagine that John wants to sit com-
fortably to continue reading a novel he has started, because he has an 
absolute right to do this, when he remembers at this very moment that 
his neighbour Adam, an old and sick man, does not have anybody who 
could help him with an urgent grain harvest. John realises that if he 
does not help Adam, his neighbour will suffer a huge loss. His univer-
sal benevolence keeps nagging him: a sense of obligation has arisen in 
him that somehow does not respect his right to rest. If this universal 
benevolence is insistent enough, the new sense of obligation will pre-
vail over the apparently unshakeable sense of the right to rest: John will 
continue to expend energy working on his neighbour’s field instead of 
recuperating it. 
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Universal benevolence cannot always tell John how far he should go 
in helping his neighbour, or more generally, with the resignation from 
his right. Why, it is possible that the help for others, using up his energy, 
will lower his capacity for work, which is his set and unquestioned mor-
al duty. This will be clearly seen when his neighbourhood attracts many 
such Adams in need of help. The problem will become acute, to the 
extent that so many hungry people would turn up around him that in 
order to feed them, if only to stave off their hunger, John would have 
to starve to death himself. At this point, universal benevolence will find 
itself in an extreme, really tragic dilemma: it will have to answer the 
question of whether one can morally save one’s life when others perish; 
or, further, is it a moral obligation to lay down one’s life for others to 
live—or even to live happily? 
This is the eternal question of heroism. For those are heroes who, 
sacrificing their moral rights, go far beyond the average demanded by 
universal benevolence. It sets people obligations in moderation so that 
their satisfaction does not overtax the average ability of a human being. 
If, thus, such a directive of moderation is adopted in setting obligations, 
a heroic act will not be an object of a moral obligation, but a generous 
and particularly valuable extra: evidence that an individual gave clear 
priority to loving their neighbours over loving their own self. Generally, 
universal benevolence gives credit to John if he makes a greater effort 
and exposes himself to a greater loss of happiness than a moral norm 
tells him to. 
Since, however, people on average are not very prone to heroism 
and do not care much about moral credit, they do good to others only 
out of the surplus and leeway left to them after the love of self, pos-
sibly extended to the next of kin. As a rule, the surplus is rather small 
in particular in societies with few material resources, in which people 
are overburdened with duties. Nonetheless, it has a value, not a moral 
but a social one, because what is useless for overfed John might have 
a high value for extremely unfed Adam. Nevertheless, universal benevo-
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lence considers the philanthropic act of John to be of little moral value, 
because it did not cause him almost any loss of happiness and even if 
it did, it was triggered by a mild surge of universal benevolence. For in 
terms of morality, an act is more valuable when more effort and self-
denial had to be put in it by the doer. 
However, the vast majority of people satisfy their obligations only 
out of that extra at best. These are the obligations that follow from the 
second, third and fourth norms: for others, they deny themselves cakes 
that they had no room for anyway. If they carefully record in memory 
such stirrings of love for their neighbours, if in hindsight they view their 
trivial sacrifices in a certain magnification and if, what is more, they see 
the suffering of other people only at a very short distance, like the short-
sighted, and even then they know how to discreetly pass over them, they 
feel morally just, or to put it differently, they feel that they satisfy all their 
moral obligations and demand from their community that they be given 
credit and respect. However, they will be denied that credit and respect 
by universally benevolent Peter, if he clearly sees how they have salved 
their conscience, which is as shallow as a rainwater puddle. He will call 
them by the name of Pharisees known from the Gospel. Despite not 
knowing the word yet, Plato wrote about such people with bitter irony.
The opposites of these pseudo-perfect people are those of uncom-
fortable conscience, who see clearly that they do not fully satisfy their 
moral obligations. They vigilantly and sensitively notice the suffering of 
other people and, realising its immense amount, find themselves help-
less. Although they know, when they think dispassionately, that they are 
unable to help everybody who needs help, when they make concrete, 
direct contact with somebody else’s suffering, they have the feeling that 
they have not done everything that their conscience dictates. They are 
not calmed either by the thought that by their work, which is their moral 
obligation, they make a certain contribution in kind to the overall sum of 
happiness. Such people will never feel morally perfect. They may come 
to terms, to an extent, with themselves if they take an active part in an 
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organised or unorganised collective effort aimed at arranging the com-
munal life so as to make the global sum of suffering continue to fall by 
itself, without any philanthropy. The very social system should, under 
the eyes of universal benevolence, be free from the causes of suffering 
and factors detracting from human joy. 
Along the long frontline of struggle against suffering, people of 
good will keep taking positions voluntarily. This still does not make 
them morally perfect, but the thought and feeling of taking an active part 
in the great work of perfecting the human world, brings them relief from 
suffering on account of the suffering of other people and salves their 
conscience, to an extent. 
In this case, too, universally benevolent Peter, but cautious due to ex-
perience, is circumspect in judging people. For he knows that the actions 
that were originally a means can easily become an end; to put it differ-
ently: an instrumental action easily becomes a consumerist action. More-
over, he is acutely aware of the tragically recurrent fact in the history of 
the human community that to improve a social system and to struggle 
against suffering, social power is necessary. In other words: it is necessary 
to have power to affect human relations by action. Power, being mere-
ly a means in the original intention, so easily provides so many benefits 
and self-satisfaction that it becomes a passionately desired end, which 
is often achieved through the mass suffering of other people. Furthermore, 
power is craved for itself, and not out of universal benevolence, by ambi-
tious people whose poor emotional nature does not provide them with 
sufficiently diverse and strong joys and who, therefore, supplement the 
balance of their happiness by outpacing others and gaining a dominant 
position. Even the ambitious however, know that goodness wins the con-
fidence of other people. Hence, they try, by word and action, to appear as 
if they have the happiness of all people at heart. 
